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Abstract
This article describes a quantum bit commitment protocol, QBC1, based on entan-
glement destruction via forced measurements and proves its unconditional security.
Note: This paper is an elaboration of my 2006 QCMC paper, arXiv: 0702074v4(2007),
published in its Proceedings volume. It was submitted in Dec 2009 as an “invited paper” to a
journal, which was withdrawn half a year later because the editors found it incomprehensible.
I hope it may make better sense to some other readers.
My reasons for the impossibility of QBC “impossibility proofs” are described in ref [1].
Over the years I have produced several QBC protocols that I thought were secure, but when
concealing they are not binding due to the scope of entanglement attack that works even
across teleportation. I did not and do not see such scope spelled out anywhere, though
1
before putting such papers on the arXiv I should have tried harder to find out whether
entanglement attack works in my cases, which I eventually did. Since 2003 I have not received
any substantial negative comment on my QBC arXiv papers, only getting a few questions
and agreements, and thus the arXiv papers have not served the purpose of soliciting technical
disagreements I sought in this controversial subject.
I have been as sure that the present protocol is secure as most results I ever published,
but I knew the environment of disagreement and did not submit any QBC paper to any
journal until Dec 2009. If this present paper is indeed incomprehensible, it would have
to be expanded before submission to a journal. In the meantime a QBC possibility paper
by G. P. He, J. Phys. A: Math. Theor. 44, 445305 (2011) has appeared in a reputable
journal. That protocol is based on an entirely different mechanism from that of this paper,
and gives a weaker form of security. Generally, the best a QBC impossibility proof can do is
to show a certain type of QBC protocols cannot be unconditionally secure. It cannot show
general impossibility for the simple reason that not all QBC protocols can be captured in
any mathematical formulation just within nonrelativistic quantum mechanics [1].
My view is that QBC can actually be practically developed and it could perform crypto-
graphic functions with security that is impossible to achieve classically. However, it would
not be through the impractical protocol of this paper and the security would not be “un-
conditional” which is never needed in practice. It appears such QBC development is only
possible after the entrenched contrary view on unconditionally secure QBC is sufficiently
softened up. I hope this paper would contribute to such end.
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I Introduction
It is nearly universally accepted that unconditionally secure quantum bit commitment (QBC)
is impossible. This is taken to be a consequence of the Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen(EPR) type
entanglment cheating. For detailed discussion with historical remarks on the impossibility
of secure QBC and the various impossibility proofs, see ref [1]-[2]. In the following, a new
approach is described that lies outside the formulation of these impossible proofs. A secure
QBC protocol, to be called QBC1, is presented together with a full proof of its uncondi-
tional security. This paper is completely self-contained other than background knowledge of
quantum mechanics.
II QBC Formulation and the Impossibility Proof
In a bit commitment scheme, one party, Alice, provides another party, Bob, with a piece of
evidence that she has chosen a bit b (0 or 1) which is committed to him. Later, Alice would
open the commitment by revealing the bit b to Bob and convincing him that it is indeed
the committed bit with the evidence in his possession and whatever further evidence Alice
then provides, which he can verify. The usual concrete example is for Alice to write down
the bit on a piece of paper, which is then locked in a safe to be given to Bob, while keeping
for herself the safe key that can be presented later to open the commitment. The scheme
should be binding, i.e., after Bob receives his evidence corresponding to a given bit value,
Alice should not be able to open a different one and convince Bob to accept it. It should
also be concealing, i.e., Bob should not be able to tell from his evidence what the bit b is.
Otherwise, either Alice or Bob would be able to cheat successfully.
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In standard cryptography, secure bit commitment is to be achieved either through a
trusted third party, or by invoking an unproved assumption concerning the complexity of
certain computational problems. By utilizing quantum effects, specifically the intrinsic un-
certainty of a quantum state, various QBC schemes not involving a third party have been
proposed to be unconditionally secure, in the sense that neither Alice nor Bob could cheat
with any significant probability of success as a matter of physical laws. In 1995-1996, a sup-
posedly general proof on the impossibility of unconditionally secure QBC and the insecurity
of previously proposed protocols were presented [3]-[4]. Henceforth it has been generally
accepted that secure QBC and related objectives are impossible as a matter of principle
[5]-[9].
There is basically just one impossibility proof, which gives the EPR attacks for the cases
of equal and nearly equal density operators that Bob has for the two different bit values. The
proof purports to show that if Bob’s successful cheating probability PBc is close to the value
1
2
, which is obtainable from pure guessing of the bit value, then Alice’s successful cheating
probability PAc is close to the perfect value 1. The impossibility proof describes the EPR
attack on a specific type of protocols, and then argues that all possible QBC protocols are
of this type.
The formulation of the standard impossibility proof can be cast as follows. Alice and
Bob have available to them two-way quantum communications that terminate in a finite
number of exchanges, during which either party can perform any operation allowed by the
laws of quantum physics, all processes ideally accomplished with no imperfection of any kind.
During these exchanges, Alice would have committed a bit with associated evidence to Bob.
It is argued that, at the end of the commitment phase, there is an openly known entangled
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pure state |Φb〉, b ∈ {0, 1}, shared between Alice who possesses state space HA, and Bob
who possesses HB. For example, if Alice sends Bob one of M possible states {|φbi〉} for bit
b with probability pbi, then
|Φb〉 =
∑
i
√
pbi |ei〉 |φbi〉 (1)
with orthonormal |ei〉 ∈ HA and known |φbi〉 ∈ HB. Alice would open by making a mea-
surement on HA, say {|ei〉}, communicating to Bob her result i0, then Bob would verify by
measuring the corresponding projector |φbi0〉〈φbi0| on HB.
When classical random numbers known only to one party are used in the commitment,
they are to be replaced by corresponding quantum entanglement purification. The commit-
ment of |φbi〉 with probability pbi in (1) is, in fact, an example of such purification. Generally,
for any random k used by Bob, it is argued from the doctrine of the “Church of the Larger
Hilbert Space” that it is to be replaced by the purification |Ψ〉 in HB1 ⊗HB2 ,
|Ψ〉 =
∑
k
√
λk |fk〉 |ψk〉 , (2)
where |ψk〉 ∈ HB2 . The {|fk〉} are complete orthonormal in HB1 kept by Bob while HB2
would be sent to Alice.
For unconditional, rather than perfect, security, one demands that both cheating proba-
bilities PBc − 12 and PAc can be made arbitarily small when a security parameter n is increased
[3]. Thus, unconditional security is quantitatively expressed as
lim
n
PBc =
1
2
, lim
n
PAc = 0. (3)
The condition (3) says that, for any ǫ > 0, there exists an n0 such that for all n > n0,
PBc − 12 < ǫ and PAc < ǫ, to which we may refer as ǫ-concealing and ǫ-binding. These cheating
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probabilities are to be computed purely on the basis of logical and physical laws, and thus
would survive any change in technology, including an increase in computational power. In
general, one can write down explicitly the optimal PBc ,
PBc =
1
4
(
2 + ‖ρB
0
− ρB
1
‖1
)
, (4)
where ‖ · ‖1 is the trace norm, ‖τ‖1 ≡ tr(τ †τ)1/2 for a trace-class operator τ .
The entanglement cheating mechanism is explicitly spelled out in the impossibility proof.
Under perfect concealing PBc =
1
2
, it follows from (4) that the state ρBb at Bob’s possession
obeys ρB
0
= ρB
1
. Hence by the Schmidt decomposition Alice can turn |φ0i〉 into |φ1i〉 by a
unitary transformation on HA in her possession, thus succeeds in cheating perfectly. Under
approximate concealing, an explicit transformation onHA can be similarly identified [10]-[11]
which leads to
4(1− PBc )2 ≤ PAc ≤ 2
√
PBc (1− PBc ). (5)
The lower bound in (5) yields the following impossibility result,
lim
n
PBc =
1
2
⇒ lim
n
PAc = 1 (6)
Note that the impossibility proof makes a stronger statement than the mere impossibility of
unconditional security, i.e., (6) is stronger than (3) not being possible.
The assumption in the impossibility formulation that |Φb〉 are openly known has been
challenged. In a multi-pass protocol where Alice and Bob exchange states, each |φbi〉 becomes
of the form |φbik〉 [9]
|φbik〉 = UAbin . . . UAbi2UBk1UAbi1 |φ0〉 . (7)
where UA
bil are unitaries that Alice applies and U
B
bkj are applied by Bob. The ancilla state
|ei〉 also separates into |eAi 〉 |eBk 〉 with |eAi 〉 in Alice’s possession and |eBk 〉 in Bob’s. It is
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clear that the exact |eBk 〉 may be kept secret by Bob, in an unnormalized form that would
include both the entanglement basis and the probability of each state in it. The question is
why secure QBC is impossible under such added randomness, whose quantum purification
is either unknown to anyone as in the case of classical random number generation from
a piece of macroscopic equipment, or at least known only to the party who preforms the
entanglement purification.
For some discussion of this point of employing unknown randomness, see [11]-[13] and
references cited therein. It turnes out it appears impossible to get a secure protocol with
this approach. For the case of perfect concealing, a general proof of this impossibility was
given in [10] for a two-pass protocol. A different argument applicable to multi-pass protocol
was given by Ozawa[14] and later independently by Cheung[15]. Simple as well as more
complicated proofs concerning all natural protocols of this kind in the case of approximate
concealing are also available. See [1]-[2], [16].
In the above formulation one may consider, more generally, the whole |Φb〉 of (1) as the
state corresponding to the bit b with Alice sending HA to Bob at opening who verifies by
measuring on the total |Φb〉. Similarly in the multi-pass case, (7) is generalized from |φbik〉
to |Φbik〉 with different subspaces of HA and HB being exchanged during each pass. The
above quantitative conclusion is not affected. Note, however, that either Alice or Bob has to
provide the initial state |φ0〉. Indeed, |φ0〉 must be on a large enough dimension state space
and openly known to both parties if either can perform random number purification. It is
more convenient to just let each party supply its own state space at each turn when needed,
and let HA and HB be their individual total spaces as just indicated. In contrast to one-pass
protocols in [4], there is then always the question of “honesty” in multi-pass protocols. It is
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clear that some form of state checking may be necessary to execute these protocols.
III New Approach
In the impossibility proof formulation the probability of interactive checking between Alice
and Bob, similar to there in QKD protocol such as BB84, is not explicitly accounted for. Even
if Bob’s check on Alice can be postponed to just before opening, Alice’s check on Bob must be
carried out during the commitment phase to maintain ǫ-concealing, The implicit assumption
must be, therefore, that such checking could be satisfied perfectly without affecting the
protocol. In this section, a new approach to QBC protocol would be described that shows
such implicit assumption cannot be true. This approach would be utilized in the next Section
IV to show how a specific secure protocol can be obtained.
Consider the following situation or “protocol”: Bob sends Alice a sequence of n qubits,
each randomly in one of the two orthogonal states |lj〉 , j ∈ {1, 2}, which are themselves
chosen randomly on a fixed great circle C of the qubit Bloch sphere. The index l indicates
the position in the n-qubit sequence. We assume for convenience that Bob entangled each lth
qubit to a qubit ancilla he keeps. Alice randomly picks one |l¯〉, modulates it by U0 = R(pi2 )
or U1 = R(−pi2 ), rotation by two different angles on C, depending on b ∈ {0, 1}, and
sends it back to Bob as commitment. Alice opens by sending back the rest and revealing
everything. Let |k〉 ∈ HA be the orthogonal entanglement ancilla states, P the cyclic shift
unitary operator on n qubits, P n = I. Suppose Alice entangles in a minimal way,
|Ψb〉 = Ub 1√
n
n∑
k=1
|k〉 ⊗ P k|1j〉...|nj〉 (8)
where |1j〉 is acted on by Ub. This “protocol” can be shown to be ǫ-concealing, and Alice
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can locally turn |Ψ0〉 to |Ψ1〉 near perfectly in a standard entanglement cheating.
Consider a protocol with the following added checking to the above. Before opening, Bob
asks Alice to send back a fraction λ, say λ = 1
2
, of the n qubits chosen randomly by Bob
for checking. If Alice replies that fraction contains the committed one, Bob would ask to
check the remaining 1−λ fraction instead. Assuming Alice has to answer correctly, she must
measure on HA to get a specific |k〉. After Bob’s checking, he still has a uniform distribution
on exactly what the original committed qubit is according to his own positions. Thus the
protocol remains ǫ-concealing if n is sufficiently large, while Alice has lost her entanglement
cheating capability. This is what was referred to as “the destruction of entanglement for
cheating” in several of my previous protocols, beginning with a first one at the 2000 QCMC
meeting in Capri, Italy.
Such ploy did not lead to a secure protocol because the entanglement (8) or a similar
sparsely entangled one was not insisted upon as part of the protocol prescription. Before it
will be discussed in the following how the entanglement (8) can be enforced, note that Alice
can retain her entanglement cheating capability by other entanglements, in particular by the
full n-permutation group. She could name her entanglement basis vectors |k〉 by the original
positions of the qubits Bob sent,
|k〉 → |1(k1), . . . , n(kn)〉 (9)
where l(kl) indicated that original qubit l is at position kl corresponding to |k〉. When she is
asked to return a fraction λ that has positions λ(m), m ∈ 1− n, she would perform a Lu¨ders
measurement, that is, a projection P ′ into the subspace inHA that fixes the {λ(m)} position.
If the entanglement is sufficient dense, the remaining 1− λ fraction is still entangled in the
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remaining ancilla space (1− P ′)HA, and entanglement cheating remains possible. With the
entanglement (8) there is no such degeneracy. In fact, P ′HA = HA. Thus, fixing the position
of just one qubit already fixes the positions of all the others.
Note that the checking of ancilla is naturally included in the generalized formulation
discussed in the last paragraph of section II—there is no system or subsystem that cannot
be exchanged. The question now is why Alice should entangle as in (8) rather than one
which allows her to cheat later. In the QBC literature, with the possible excepting of (2),
the claim has always been that even under honest following of the protocol prescription,
no protocol can be secure [5]-[9]. In the presence of interactive checking as above, we here
conclusively shown that such claim is incorrect.
The “honesty” assumption is widely used in the literature to describe multi-pass protocol
including those for quantum coin tossing [17]. It may or may not make sense depending on
whether the“honest” action can in principle be checked by the other party without rendering
the protocol ineffective. For example, in the simple one-pass protocol of [4], it makes no
sense to require Alice to be honest and does not entangle. It is clear that an actual physical
entanglement is needed for the EPR cheating even when the protocol is perfectly concealing.
Note that this is in fact the basis of the success of checking for preventing entanglement
cheating with (8), that only classical randomness is left after checking. Thus, Alice would
entangle anyway in the situation of [4] and the simple protocol that requires such “honesty”
is not secure.
In a multi-pass protocol, there is always the question whether “honest entanglement” or
any other prescription of the protocol is followed. Even with just a two-pass QBC protocol in
which Bob first sends Alice some qubits in prescribed states, including the above “protocol”
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involving (8), he can easily cheat by sending in other qubits instead. For example, he could
send in identical fixed qubit states and so he would know how to measure to distinguish
b = 0, 1 from the committed qubit with considerable PBc >
1
2
for any {U0, U1} pair. He is
prevented from such cheating via checking of one form or another.
A crucial question is: what happens when one party is found cheating during protocol
execution. Clearly the party cannot be allowed to keep cheating indefinitely, if only because
of “intent” [11] since the party does not need to participate to begin with. I have previously
described [18] several approaches to deal with this problem which has not yet received an
adequate discussion in the literature, but which can be solved in one stroke by an honesty
assumption that requires all the parties to be perfectly honest in their prescribed actions and
thus no cheating would even be found before opening. This is a perfectly reasonable working
assumption for the ideal protocol under discussion as long as the action can be checked, in
view of the discussion just given above. It is equivalent to the assignment of infinite penalty
in a game type formulation [18], and it allows us to bring forth our new point without the
burden of technicalities. It is also exactly what has been implicitly assumed in the literature
as we mentioned.
Note that the whole protocol may need to be started all over again after a checking. It is
easy to see that in the absence of resource constraint as in the case of all QBC impossibility
proof formulations thus far, one party can check the same state an arbitrarily large number
of times before proceeding. The total number of checks may grow multiplicatively, not just
linearly, with the number of state checking. It is reasonable to count cheating detection
probability as the party’s failure probability in PAc and P
B
c . Thus, whenever a bound is
imposed on the allowable total number of cheatings getting caught, an unconditionally secure
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protocol would be obtained which is equivalent to the honest assumption. This is because
both PAc and P
B
c can be brought arbitrarily close to their prescribed ǫ-level with a large
enough number of checkings on each state.
The point that was made in this section in connection with (8) has the following general
implication independently of whether a secure protocol can be made on that basis: There is
no general impossibility proof that shows the entanglement formed by one party as prescribed
by a QBC protocl would have effective remaining entanglement after checking. In the next
section, however, we do exhibit such a specific secure protocol.
IV Secure Protocol QBC1
We consider the following protocol QBC1 [19] in which Bob sends Alice a sequence of n
qubits as described in the last section, requiring Alice to entangle as in (8). We will show
later in appropriate places how that as well as any other prescribed states for Alice and Bob
can be checked. That the protocol is ǫ-concealing is intuitively obvious, and can be proved as
follow. For simplicity we let the protocol prescribe that each of the qubit state Bob sends is
entangled with an ancilla in his possession. Alice can check this before proceeding by asking
Bob to send her the qubit ancilla and measuring to verify.
Concealing Proof for QBC1:
First we assume that Bob does not permutation entangle the n qubit. It is technically
messy to show concealing if she does, but the absence of such permutation entanglement
can be assured by requiring Bob to permutation entangle as in (8), and destroyed by Alice
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asking to check one or more of the qubits. That Bob did entangle in such manner in the
first place can be checked by asking him to send in the ancilla for Alice to check.
For simplicity we do not distinguish here a qubit state from the qubit which is clear from
context. Let al be the ancilla part of Bob’s states entangled to the lth qubit. Then al =
I
2
without the ith qubit and
ρb =
1
n
n∑
l=1
a1 ⊗ . . .⊗ (σbal)⊗ · · · ⊗ an (10)
In (10), (σbal) denotes the state obtained by pairing of the lth ancilla state to the committed
qubit, σb is the committed part of the committed qubit-ancilla entangled pair. We have
(σbal) = σb⊗al when the pairing is incorrect but is a properly qubit-ancilla state when they
match. From (10),
n(ρ0 − ρ1) = [(σ0al¯)− (σ1al¯)]⊗l 6=l¯ al + (σ0 − σ1)⊗l al (11)
where l¯ is the actual position of the committed qubit. Since σ0 = σ1 =
I
2
for incorrect
matching and ‖(σ0−σ1)⊗ a‖1 = ‖σ0−σ1‖1 for all density operators σ0, σ1 and a, from (11)
‖ρ0 − ρ1‖1 = 1
n
‖(σ0al¯)− (σ1al¯)‖1 =
2
n
(12)
which can be made arbitrarily small with large n. Equation (12) expresses exactly the intu-
itively obvious fact that Bob succeeds in cheating when and only when he guesses correctly
which original qubit the committed qubit is.
Binding Proof for QBC1:
Since σb =
I
2
without Bob’s ancilla, the probability that Alice can determine the state
of the committed qubit she chooses for commitment is arbitrarily small, given by 1
M
for M
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possible states on C and is zero asymptotically. Without the possibility of entanglement
cheating, Alice can simply declare the bit she wants to open. In that situation PAc is given
by the inner product square of the two possible committed state. With our choice PAc = 0
since the two states for the two different b values are orthogonal.
Note that as in the discussion of QBC since the beginning, an ǫ-concealing protocol can
be made ǫ-binding in a sequence of committed qubits to obtain a single secure bit whenever
PAc is not too close to 1 for each original qubit. In the above QBC1, such a sequence has
also been indicated in our previous version in [19] for such purpose. It is not needed if the
two bit states are orthogonal or nearly orthogonal and if completely random qubit states on
C are supplied by Bob.
It remains to show that (8) can be checked and no security leak could occur during the
checking process. In contrast to the states sent in by Bob, it is more complicated to check
(8) since Alice already committed by then, but it can be done as follow.
Checking of Entanglement (8):
Alice would first send her ancillas of (8) to Bob with an entanglement basis unknown to
him. Then Bob sends back Alice’s committed qubit to her who would turn it back to the
original state by reversing her Ub. Then she sends back all qubits to Bob who can thus (8).
We now show there can be no security compromise in the checking and each party must
follow the prescription as all relevant states can be checked. First, Bob can derive no in-
formation on which qubit he sent is committed without first knowing what qubit positions
are indicated by what ancilla state. The ancilla he so receives back from Alice is a totally
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random state to him. Secondly, Alice must send in her entanglement ancilla and tell Bob
later exactly what the total state is, as prescribed in the checking. Third, that Bob then
sends back the correct qubit can be checked by Alice via asking Bob to send back all the
relevant states in his possession which include his ancilla, Alice’s committed qubit, and her
ancilla that was sent him. Alice can then check similar to the beginning check on Bob’s n
qubit ancilla state. Finally, Alice must send back the proper states or else Bob cannot verify
(8).
We have completed the security proof with proper operation procedure for QBC1. As-
suming honest operation that we have shown can all be checked, the protocol can be simply
summarized in the following:
PROTOCOL QBC1
1. Bob sends Alice n-qubits, each randomly from a fixed great circle of the qubit Bloch
sphere.
2. Alice forms (8) and modulates the first qubit by U0 = R(
pi
2
) or U1 = R(
−pi
2
) and
sends it back to Bob.
3. Bob randomly chooses half of the qubits he sent and asks Alice to send them back
for checking. If Alice says it contains the committed one, Bob asks to check the
other half instead.
4. Alice opens by sending back all qubits and revealing everything; Bob verifies.
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V Scope of QBC Possibility
It has long been known that a trusted third party or special relativistic effects can be used
to establish secure bit commitment protocol both classically and quantum mechanically.
Furthermore, D’Ariano has suggested [20] that casuality or time order cannot be purified
and is built into quantum mechanics already in a way that would imply special relativity.
If true this would imply quantum mechanics by itself would ensure the possibility of secure
QBC similar to Kent’s relativistic protocol [21]. Cheung [22] has recently proposed a secure
protocol on the basis of timing effect. In this paper, we show that quantum mechanics allows
secure QBC without invoking causality or timing, in a way that was first described in [19].
The exact mechanism of how our QBC1 falls outside the standard impossibility proof
is made clear in section III above. There seem to be some vague claims of universal QBC
impossibility in ref [2] and [23]. Both papers are presented in unfamiliar mathematical
formulation of C∗-algebra or “quantum comb” with no translation into the usual formulation.
In both of these new formulations, there is no clear indication on exactly what would happen
when one party is found cheating during protocol execution. Just aborting the protocol
is not enough as one party can keep on cheating as discussed in section III. While the
number of allowable protocol abortions may be bounded in [23], cheating detection entails
no penalty in any form. More significantly, it appears there is no restriction put on the
parties’ entanglement purification and a private ancilla not to be checked is allowed, thus
excluding QBC1 in these formulations.
A most important point that is not addressed before in all the impossible proofs that
claim universality is what the proof is that all possible QBC protocols have been included.
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A general discussion of this issue can be found in [1]. A main point that has not even been
made clear in [1] is that a ‘machine’ formulation cannot capture all the possible protocols,
classical or quantum, that can be clearly formulated with ordinary natural language due
to the ‘meaning’ problem. Specific intended meaning can be captured by a mechanical
process, but not all possible meaning in a general context. This is the situation of human
knowledge that, I believe, would not be changed in the future. In the present QBC issue,
one manifestation of this situation is that there is no general mathematical definition which
captures all possible QBC protocols.
As a concluding remark, practical QBC protocols can be developed that can be proved
secure within technological limits that are unlikely to be removed in the foreseeable fu-
ture. Entanglement across many qubits already by itself falls under these limits. Such
implementable protocols could be practically significant even if they are not unconditionally
secure under the impractical assumption of ideal system devices and components.
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